Previous works on social network de-anonymization focus on designing accurate and efficient deanonymization methods. We attempt to investigate the intrinsic relationship between the attacker's knowledge and the expected de-anonymization gain. A common intuition is that more knowledge results in more successful de-anonymization. However, our analysis shows this is not necessarily true if the attacker uses the full background knowledge for de-anonymization. Our findings leave intriguing implications for the attacker to make better use of the background knowledge for de-anonymization and for the data owners to better measure the privacy risk when releasing their data to third parties. 33:2 J. Qian et al.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays we are able to collect and analyze data from various social networking sites like Facebook and Weibo, which may contain sensitive information about individuals. Typical social is monotone increasing with the amount of background knowledge, which is consistent with our intuition. However, it is not monotone increasing in other cases. For example, it could first decrease, then reach the valley point, and finally rise to the highest point. We refer to this as the transition phenomenon, further explained in Sections 3 and 4. Our findings are based on some assumptions, but the transition phenomenon still leaves interesting implications for both data publishers and attackers. Here is the potential application of this work: given a graph dataset that follows the G(n, p) or power-law model, the publisher or the attacker can first estimate the parameters of the model (p for the G(n, p) model or β for the power-law model), use the formulas we derived in Sections 3 and 4 to plot the curves, and then optimize the anonymization or de-anonymization according to the insights in Section 5.3.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first attempt to quantitatively study the influence of background knowledge on de-anonymization gain. We present our definition of de-anonymization gain and quantification of background knowledge. We model background knowledge as a probabilistic graph and formulate how the attacker matches candidate subgraphs with her knowledge both generally and under specific circumstances. • Our theoretical analysis reveals that in certain situations, more background knowledge does not always result in more de-anonymization gain. We further explain the reasons and the meaning of the critical points in their relationship curves. • We present rich simulations on both synthetic and real network datasets even though we face the challenge of approximating the NP-complete subgraph matching problem. The experiment displays different kinds of relationships between background knowledge and deanonymization gain.
PRELIMINARIES
We first introduce subgraph matching, the essence of social network de-anonymization attack, and then define the de-anonymization attack on top of that. We will also briefly introduce two popular graph models: G(n, p) random graphs and power-law graphs, which are to be used to model the social network.
Subgraph Matching
Subgraph matching, a.k.a., subgraph isomorphism, is a fundamental computational problem on graphs. It aims to find a subgraph in a graph G that is isomorphic to another (usually smaller) graph Q. We introduce the following important concepts that are critical to our model and analysis.
Definition 1 (Subgraph) . Given a graph G (V , E), a subgraph G s (V s , E s ) is a graph such that V s ⊆ V and E s ⊆ E. The problem has been proved to be NP-complete [11] . Figure 1 shows an example of subgraph matching. The problem subgraph counting is more related to this article but even harder to solve, which requires counting or enumerating the matches (defined as follows) of Q in G. Fig. 1 . Subgraph matching: I is a randomly picked candidate of Q, i.e., an induced subgraph of G yielded by randomly choosing n Q nodes in G and mapping them with nodes in Q. Whether Q and I match is up to how we define "match." Definition 4 (Match) . Given G and Q, a match is a subset V s ⊆ V together with a bijective mapping f :
We denote the number of matches obtained from querying G with Q by M (G, Q ) (M Q for short) and the set of matches by M Q . We will analyze de-anonymization on the basis of subgraph matching.
Social Network De-Anonymization
Social network de-anonymization [4, 25] refers to the process of re-identifying anonymous nodes in a released social network. The attacker usually possesses rich background knowledge, e.g., another social network data set, so de-anonymization is a problem of mapping users in the background knowledge Q to nodes in the network G. De-anonymization is similar to but much more than subgraph matching. We define "matching" in a broad sense, since many real factors need to be taken into consideration, including the matching of nodal attributes, subset matching, exact matching, fuzzy subset matching, and probabilistic matching.
Definition 5 (De-Anonymization). Given a published graph G, an attacker's de-anonymization of Q refers to an algorithm that, on inputs G and Q, identifies a subset of nodes V I ⊆ V and a bijective mapping f : V Q → V I s.t. the subgraph I induced by V I in G matches Q under f (denoted by I f Q, or I Q for simplicity). Herein, the verb "match" can be defined in terms of structure and/or attribute similarity from multiple perspectives (Section 2.5). Such V I and the corresponding f together are referred to as a match of V Q . There could be multiple matches (denote match number by M Q ) in G, but only one real match of Q exists whose nodes exactly correspond to real-life users in Q.
To simplify, we assume Q is connected and that the attacker de-anonymizes Q as a whole; otherwise, the problem equals de-anonymizing multiple connected query graphs.
De-Anonymization Gain
To quantify de-anonymization, we have to take the background knowledge Q into account, because it affects how much user identity information will be recovered. Though subgraph matching is NP-complete, researchers have been working on designing various approximation algorithms to overcome it, such as using landmark identification techniques to prune the search space [4, 18, 25] . Meanwhile, the computation power of machines is continuously increasing, e.g., quantum computers might be able to solve some NP-complete problems. Thus, to measure the potential de-anonymization gain, it is reasonable to assume that the attacker is computationally powerful enough to find all the matches of Q in G. From the publisher's perspective, this is also a metric of the de-anonymizability of G under the attack with Q. Since any of these matches M Q is exactly consistent with her background knowledge, she cannot tell them apart so any of them is treated as a possible candidate of the real match of the query. If she randomly picks a match I ∈ M Q , the probability that she picks the real match (i.e., the real correspond of Q) is 1/M Q . Therefore, the quantity of matches reflects the de-anonymization gain in one sense, which is similar to kanonymity [38] . The more matches are yielded by querying G with Q, the less possible it is that user identities are recovered by the attacker. Let the number of nodes in G, Q be n, n Q , respectively. When the attacker picks the real match (with probability 1 M Q ), n Q users are de-anonymized. If she picks a wrong match, then none (in the worst case) or part of the n Q users are de-anonymized. We cannot give a formula of the expected number of de-anonymized users, but we know its infimum (i.e., worst case) is 1
We define de-anonymization gain as the expected fraction of de-anonymized users in the published graph G. Then, the infimum of de-anonymization gain is calculated as follows:
if M Q 0. We define DAG (Q ) = 0 when M Q = 0, i.e., when the attacker cannot find any match. Previous anonymization works could be viewed as lowering DAG (Q ) by increasing M Q , e.g., using k-anonymity-based methods. In the rest of this article, when we mention de-anonymization gain, we refer to its infimum. Table 1 lists the frequently used symbols.
Graph Models
2.4.1 G(n, p) Random Graph Model. There are two closely related variants of the Erdös-Rényi (ER) model, but we focus on the G(n, p) model only. In the G(n, p) model, a graph is constructed by connecting nodes randomly. Each edge is added to the graph with probability p independently from every other edge. As p increases from 0 to 1, the graphs become denser. Such random graphs are fundamental and useful for modeling problems in many applications. However, a random graph in G(n, p) has the same expected degree at every node and thus does not capture some behaviors of the graphs developed in the real world.
Power-Law Graph Model.
A graph is said to have the power-law property if its degree sequence satisfies the power-law distribution. Namely, the fraction of nodes with degree d is proportional to d −β for some constant β. Many real-world networks, at least asymptotically, conform to the power-law model, e.g., citation networks [35] and social networks [24] . Networks with power-law degree distributions are sometimes referred to as scale-free networks. Typically, the parameter β for real-world power-law networks is in the range 2 < β < 3 [9] . Power-law graphs can be generated with different methods, such as the preferential attachment mechanism [1].
Background Knowledge Model
To be general, the attacker's knowledge on users' relations could be probabilistic. Suppose in the query graph Q, each edge e i j is associated with a probability p(e i j ) (0 ≤ p(e i j ) ≤ 1) to represent the attacker's confidence over e i j . Q is a complete graph; edges that she believes do not exist is associated with zero confidence. We can quantify background knowledge from two aspects.
By quantity: The amount of background knowledge can simply be measured by its scalar quantity, such as node number, edge number, and attribute number. We choose node number n Q as the metric for our theoretical analysis. The number of extra edges in Q that do no exist in I δ (I , Q )
The number of edges missing in Q but existing in I ϵ e
The limit in δ (Q, I ) in fuzzy matching ϵ m
The limit in δ (I , Q ) in fuzzy matching
Probability of two nodes sharing attribute A i p A Probability of two nodes sharing all the attribute Pr(a b) Probability of two attribute values a, b matching approximately p(e i j )
The attacker's confidence on the edge e i j connecting nodes i, j Q c Any configuration generated from V Q d i Degree of node i By quality: The particularity of background knowledge also determines the success rate of deanonymization. Special knowledge, such as the "outstanding" nodes (a.k.a. seeds), edges, attributes, and patterns, can help the attacker filter the candidate matches. The more different the attacker's belief is from the global distribution, the more informative and valuable the knowledge is. Thus, background knowledge can be quantified by quality as well, e.g., the number of nodes with high degrees, graph density, the number of special structural patterns like cliques, the ratio of edges whose probabilities are close to 1 or 0 if the attacker has probabilistic knowledge, or the number of users with a particular attribute whose distribution is very distinct from the global distribution (measured by Kullback-Leibler divergence). We will also use the ratio of highly deterministic edges and graph density as the metrics. Both of them inflect the quality of the attacker's background knowledge of the structural information.
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ON G(N, P ) GRAPHS
Here, we study the case where G follows the G(n, p) random graph model. For both the general case and special cases, we present formulas to calculate the match number M Q , which decides the de-anonymization gain DAG (Q ) by Equation (1) . We will also plot the relationship between DAG (Q ) and the amount of background knowledge in the end of this section.
Graph Matching in General
First, we have the following theorem to compute M Q . Theorem 1. Given a graph G ∈ G(n, p) and any query graph Q whose node number is n Q and edge number is m Q , let I be a randomly selected candidate of Q (Figure 1 ), the expected number of matches of Q in an ER random graph G(n, p) is
where Q I means Q and I are matched. We will omit the expectation symbol E(·) hereafter.
The rationale is similar to exhaustive search. As shown in Figure 1 , the number of possible candidates like I is ( n n Q )n Q !. Since G is a random graph, we can compute the probability of Q and I being a match (defined later) and then use it to estimate M Q , and further estimate DAG (Q ) by Equation (1). The exponential bounds for the upper and lower tails of the distribution of M Q have been discussed previously [15, 16] . This theorem does not make any assumption about Q. It can be any given graph with arbitrary structure, e.g., an ego network or a two-hop neighborhood graph.
In the real world, users in a social network have attributes like gender, age, and occupation. The attacker could have users' relations and attributes in her background knowledge. Then, Q and I are considered to be a match if both of their edges and node attributes are considered as matched. Pr (Q I ) = Pr (Q e I ) · Pr (Q a I ), where e represents "match in edges" and a represents "match in attributes."
In the general case, a probability p(e i j ) is assigned to each edge e i j in Q to represent the attacker's confidence. Q is a complete graph, so it has m 0 = n Q (n Q − 1)/2 edges. The random graph Q has 2 m 0 configurations that could be generated from V Q . The attacker can compare each configuration (denoted by Q c ) with I to calculate the probabilistic that Q and I are matched.
In reality, data publishers usually add noise/perturbation to the datasets before publishing them to increase the difficulty of de-anonymization. Such perturbation techniques include generalization, suppression, swapping, and so on. Meanwhile, noise could be brought to Q as well because of inaccurate information gathering. In such circumstances, the attacker may perform fuzzy matching when comparing Q c and I , by allowing at most ϵ e extra edges and at most ϵ m missing edges in Q c . We use δ (Q, I ) to denote the number of extra edges in Q that do not exist in I and use δ (I , Q ) to denote the number of missing edges in Q that exist in I . Thus,
The formulas have become really complex, even though we have not expanded Pr (Q a I ) yet. For simplification, we consider some special cases as follows, where clean formulas can be yielded.
Deterministic Knowledge with Attribute Ignored
Sometimes the attacker uses only structural information for de-anonymization [17, 18] . Since she has deterministic knowledge, Q has only one configuration. To decide if I is a match of Q, she only needs to check if their edges match, so Pr (Q I ) = Pr (Q e I ). Besides fuzzy matching, there are another three commonly used matching methods, which can also be treated as special cases of fuzzy matching.
Subset Matching
. At first, we consider the situation where the attacker uses her knowledge for exact but partial matching. Because of incomplete information gathering, the attacker may possess accurate but incomplete background knowledge. The attacker believes every edge e i j in Q is correct and indispensable, but there might be edges missing in Q that in fact exist in G. Thus, the attacker performs non-induced subgraph matching, commonly referred to as subset matching. I is a match if Q is a subgraph of I , i.e., every edge in Q has a counterpart in I (the probability is p because of the G(n, p) model). Redundant edges in I is acceptable and not of interest, so we have
Note only node number and edge number of Q are involved in this formula; its network structure can be arbitrary and has no influence on the result. Once we have the formula for M Q , it is easy to calculate the de-anonymization gain DAG (Q ) by Equation (1).
Exact
Matching (ϵ e = 0, ϵ m = 0). If the attacker believes her knowledge is exact and complete, then she performs induced subgraph matching (exact matching). When she compares the edges of Q and I , I is not considered as a match if it has any redundant or missing edge. Thus, we have
Fuzzy Subset Matching
. This is a relaxation of subset matching, which we call fuzzy subset matching. I is considered to be a match of Q if δ (Q, I ) ≤ ϵ e ; missing edges in Q are completely acceptable. In this scenario,
Deterministic Knowledge with Attribute Included
Suppose each node in G and Q is attached with n A attributes, denoted by A i , 0 ≤ i ≤ n A . Each of the attributes has a domain, denoted by
be the probability of a node being labeled as a, for any a ∈ A i . Then, the expected probability of any two nodes sharing at- When the attacker performs subset matching on edges (it can be easily extended to other cases), and exactly correct knowledge on attributes, the expected number of matches she will obtain is
3.3.1 Fuzzy Knowledge on Attributes. Similar to fuzzy knowledge on edges, the attacker can have a few inaccurate information (caused by imperfect information gathering and data perturbation on G) about users' attributes (at most ϵ pairs of nodes with mismatched attributes):
"Fuzzy" can also be interpreted in another way. Two users are still considered to match in attributes if they disagree in at most ϵ out of n A attributes (ϵ < n A ). Then, p A should be modified to
where A is the set of all the attributes, and S is the set of unmatched attributes.
Approximate Attribute
Matching. Due to the noise added by the publisher to graph G, a few attribute values in G might be twisted. A node corresponding to a real-life person might have slightly different attribute values than those of the person. For example, a person is 31 years old, but her age is distorted to 30 in G. If the attacker is aware of the possible discrepancies between her background knowledge and the information presented in G, then it is very likely she ignores minor attribute discrepancies while performing subgraph matching attack. To estimate the number of results yielded by subgraph query under this circumstance, we need to redefine p A i :
where Pr (a b) represents the probability that a and b approximately match. As an example for age, the probability that 30 and 40 are an approximate match is 0, but the probability of 30 and 32 can be set to 1. The probability can be computed with similarity functions such as cosine similarity, Dirac delta function, or exp(−x ). We do not expand the formula of Pr (a b) here, because it has different definitions for different attributes.
Probabilistic Knowledge

Probabilistic Knowledge & Subset
Matching. Due to the partial knowledge assumption, we have Pr (Q c e I ) = p |E (Q c ) | . The computation cost of Pr (Q e I ) in Equation (3) is exponential. One simplifying method is to assume p(e i j ) = p e , ∀e i j ∈ E Q . Following Equation (3), we can derive
An alternative simplification is to sample from the 2 m 0 configuration and then rescale the result.
Probabilistic Knowledge & Exact Matching. When the attacker believes her knowledge is complete, Pr
When it is assumed all p(e i j ) = p e , we can derive
A more realistic simplification is to assume that the attacker's confidence on edges of the complete graph Q has three levels: high (p(e i j ) = p 1 say 0.9), low (p(e i j ) = p 0 say 0.1) and medium (say p(e i j ) = p for G(n, p)). For edges with medium confidence, the attacker has no additional knowledge of them, so she will overlook the checking of their occurrence in I . Given p 1 , p 0 and suppose the number of the three types of edges are x 1 , x 0 , x m , respectively (
We can measure background knowledge by the ratio of highly deterministic edges r = x 1 +x 0 m 0 , which reflects the quality of the knowledge. We will also plot the influence of r on DAG (Q ).
Probabilistic
Attributes. The attacker could also have uncertain knowledge about users' attributes. Suppose for each nodal attribute in Q, there is a probability distribution p i over the domain of the attribute reflecting the attacker's belief. If she has no additional knowledge about a person's attribute A i , then her belief is set to the original distribution in G, that is Pr A i . Then the probability of two nodes sharing attribute
where Pr (a b) represents the probability that a and b match.
Analytical Results
As aforementioned, we have listed the formulas to calculate M Q , from which we can compute DAG (Q ). We study the impact of background knowledge on the de-anonymization gain and plot it in Figures 2-5 for every case discussed above by varying all kinds of parameters. Please see Table 3 for a complete list. To control variables when studying the influence of every variable on DAG (Q ), we must set a baseline. We choose reasonable default values for the variables listed in Table 2 . This is a reasonable setting and it also well presents the curves. We have tried all possible parameter values apart from the default, and the results are similar under most settings. Yet, some settings are not reasonable or interesting, which can be seen from the figures, e.g., when p or p A is too small or when p q is too big.
When background knowledge is quantified by the number of nodes n Q , more background knowledge indeed results in more de-anonymization gain for the attacker in some settings, which conforms to our intuition. For instance, as shown in Figures 3(b) and 3(f), when p q = 0.5 ∼ 0.8, DAG (Q ) is monotone increasing with respect to n Q . When the background knowledge is quantified by the ratio of highly deterministic edges r , DAG (Q ) is also monotone increasing with respect to r , as indicated by Figures 5(d) -5(f). We see that in some cases, more adversarial knowledge implies a higher risk of user identities being compromised.
However, this is not always the case. Most curves in Figure 2 show a counter-intuitive relationship between DAG (Q ) and n Q . They have a transition phenomenon: with growing n Q , DAG (Q ) first decreases until reaching a valley and then increases to the highest. There are two critical points, valley point and vanishing point, referring to the values of n Q where DAG (Q ) reaches the valley and the highest point, respectively. When n Q is greater than the vanishing point, we get the estimated number of matches M Q ≤ 1 according to the formulas. In real-world attacks, when the background knowledge reaches the vanishing point, the attacker finds only one match and (Figures (a) -(c)) and r (Figures (d) -(f)) on de-anonymization gain for probabilistic edges and complete knowledge on G(n, p). Attacker's high confidence on edges 0.9 p 0 Attacker's low confidence on edges 0.1 r Ratio of highly deterministic edges 0.5
We set a default value for each of them to control variables when plotting each of their influence on the results. All possible parameter values are tried in addition to the default values. thus users are de-anonymized successfully. Furthermore, the curves reveal that the positions of the critical points are decided by multiple parameters including p, p q , p A , r . The occurrence of transition phenomenon can be explained by Theorem 1. The match number M Q , which determines de-anonymization gain is influenced by two factors, the size of mapping space ( n n Q )n Q ! and the matching probability Pr (Q I ). The mapping space increases with growing n Q owing to an increasing number of node permutations. The matching probability decreases with respect to n Q as a randomly selected candidate needs to meet more and more requirements to be a match of Q. The two factors have the opposite effects on M Q , so there is a chance that a transition phenomenon occurs.
We also plotted (though not presented here) the relationship between de-anonymization gain and p q with fixed n Q . The results conform to the intuition, i.e., a denser Q would contribute to a more successful de-anonymization attack. Therefore, we reach the conclusion that more knowledge does imply more de-anonymization gain in some settings, but that might not always be the case.
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ON POWER-LAW GRAPHS
In this section, we study the relationship of de-anonymization gain and background knowledge when G conforms to the power-law model. A power-law graph can be generated with a given degree sequence that has a power-law distribution [10] . Specifically, n(d ) = αd −β , where n(d ) represents the number of nodes with degree d ∈ N + , α, β are predefined parameters, and β > 2. It is tricky to give a formula of M Q , but we derive a lower bound for it for the case of subset matching with attribute ignored.
The proof is given in Appendix A. We can use this result to estimate the upper bound of DAG (Q ). Analytical Results. We set p q = 0.05 as default and set other parameters as given in Table 2 . As shown in Figure 6 , in some settings there is a transition phenomenon in the relationship between the upper bound of DAG (Q ) and n Q for power-law graphs, but in other settings (e.g., p q = 0.3 ∼ 0.5) there is no transition phenomenon ( Figure 6(b) ).
SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present our simulations on both synthetic data and real network datasets. We will explain the relationship observed between background knowledge and de-anonymization gain based on the results obtained. 
Methodology
Due to the hardness of subgraph matching/counting, many previous works focus on designing approximation algorithms [3, 5, 36] . The biggest challenge in the experiment is to estimate the match number M Q , which relies on the NP-complete subgraph counting problem. We implement a state-of-the-art approximate algorithm [5] , which still has exponential time and space complexity. Although it only applies to undirected graphs and query graphs with treewidth no more than 2, it is so far the work with the least restrictions about the size and structure of queries. On the contrary, other approximation algorithms [36] are usually limited to very small-sized query graphs (less than 10 nodes for example), or query graphs with a specific structure, like triangles, circles, or trees. Datasets. We verify our claims on both synthetic data and real network data. For synthetic data, we generate random power-law graphs with n = 100K and different β. For real datasets, we use both online social networks (Facebook, YouTube, LiveJournal) and collaboration networks (DBLP, Arxiv Cond-Mat) from SNAP. 1 See Table 4 for statistics. They have power-law-like degree distribution as shown in Figure 7(d) . The Facebook dataset is not a whole social network but combined from multiple ego networks, so its degree distribution does not display a nice power-law distribution.
The experiment on each dataset consists of 4 steps: (1) preprocess the original graph G, (2) generate query graphs Q by varying n Q and m Q , respectively, (3) query G with Q, calculate M Q and DAG (Q ), and (4) plot the relationship between DAG (Q ) and n Q or graph density p q (p q = 2m Q n Q (n Q −1) ).
In the second step above, query graphs are generated by randomly extracting ego networks from G. De-anonymizing ego networks is also commonly researched in the literature [40, 43] . We distinguish ego networks as stars and non-stars as they have different influence on the matching results. Star queries usually have large quantities of matches in G due to their considerable automorphisms.
Experimental Results and Analysis
The majority of ego networks we sampled are stars (especially for power-law graphs, the ratio is 60 ∼ 90%). The results for star queries are displayed in Figures 7(a)-7(c) , which reveals that de-anonymizing Q of greater size is more difficult. This is because stars of larger size have more automorphisms, which results in more matches found in G. The curves in the figure end when n Q exceeds the highest degree. For non-star queries, the results are presented as follows.
Knowledge quantified by n Q (quantity): The relationship between de-anonymization gain and n Q for synthetic data is plotted in Figure 8(a) . It reveals that DAG (Q ) first descends and then fluctuates or picks up a bit when n Q grows. We only present the results of the smaller datasets (Facebook, DBLP, and Arxiv-CondMat) with n Q ≤ 18. The subgraph counting algorithm could not be finished on other datasets because of the "out of memory" error. Though we have not clearly observed the transition phenomenon yet, we can at least learn from this figure that more background More Adversarial Knowledge, More Users Re-Identified? 33:15 Fig. 7 . The impact of n Q on DAG (Q ) for star queries on synthetic/real networks (Figures (a)-(c) ) and degree distribution of real networks (Figure (d) ): The greater n Q is, the smaller DAG (Q ) is.
knowledge does not always induce more de-anonymization gain in some cases. Similar phenomena are also found for real networks, as depicted by Figure 8(b) . The curves are not smooth owing to three possible reasons: (1) the approximate subgraph counting algorithm is not perfectly accurate; (2) real networks do not exactly follow the power-law model; (3) even if we could accurately count the number of matches, real networks are not random graphs, so we cannot run algorithms many times and use the average to estimate the"expectation" to eliminate the "outliers."
Knowledge quantified by p q (quality): Figures 8(c) and 8(d) display the relationship between DAG (Q ) and p q . It is shown that sometimes DAG (Q ) first increases then slowly decreases again with growing p q . At first, the denser Q is, the more "special" it is, so fewer matches are found and it is easier to pinpoint each user. However, when p q reaches a threshold, Q has more automorphisms when p q is greater; Q has the most number of automorphisms when it is a clique. This is a possible explanation of the rise-then-fall of DAG (Q ). Therefore, we can learn that more adversarial knowledge does not always bring more de-anonymization gain. Some may question why only a few data points are plotted in the figures. This is because p q is determined by m Q , and the algorithm we use does not support querying dense graphs.
Unfortunately, we are unable to guarantee that our experimental results in Figure 8 apply to larger power-law graphs too. We will verify the results on larger graphs when we have more powerful machines to run the simulations.
Implications
Medium-density queries are more powerful. Graph automorphism makes it harder to tell individual nodes apart and exactly de-anonymize them, even if the attacker finds the right subgraph in G corresponding to Q. An ego network has the most number of automorphisms when it is either very sparse (close to a star) or very dense (close to a clique). As revealed in Figure 8 (c) and 8(d), the de-anonymization gain first increases to the peak and then gradually drops again. Namely, de-anonymization with query graphs of medium density might be the easiest. By the cask effect, the data protector can design perturbation methods to lower the peak to improve the overall data privacy.
Attack-resistance of data. No matter if there is a transition phenomenon, the vanishing point reflects the attack-resistance property of the published graph G, since it is the point with the worst user identity leak (the target users in Q are all successfully de-anonymized). A greater vanishing point implies that G is more resistant to de-anonymization attacks, that is, the attacker needs to collect more background knowledge to recover users' identities. The position of the vanishing point is up to the properties and parameters of G and Q (recall Section 3.5). An implication for data publishers is that changing G's properties during data perturbation to defer the vanishing point may also help reduce the risk of privacy leak.
Break knowledge and attack better. The difficulty of de-anonymization is twofold: the computational complexity of subgraph matching and the indistinguishability of the matches. In the settings with a transition phenomenon, the attacker might achieve better attacker results, i.e., pinpoint users with a higher probability, if she breaks down her background knowledge graph into several smaller graphs and finds their matches separately. For example, when n Q is around the peak point, this strategy might make the de-anonymization more efficient and accurate. However, the attacker should not reduce her knowledge when n Q is near the vanishing point, or she would achieve worse attack result. Though the effectiveness of the strategy still needs verifying, our work might help the attacker to make better use of the background knowledge for de-anonymization attack. The question of when and how to break the knowledge is saved for our future work.
Application. Given a graph dataset that follows the G(n, p) or power-law model, the publisher or the attacker can first estimate the parameters of the model (p for the G(n, p) model or β for the power-law model), use the formulas we derived in Sections 3 and 4 to plot the curves, and then optimize the anonymization or de-anonymization according to the insights mentioned above.
DISCUSSION
Community-level de-anonymization. Sometimes user identity privacy is disclosed when the attacker knows that a user belongs to a community (such as a drug rehabilitation or disease treatment group), even though the user is not exactly de-anonymized at the individual level. We refer to it as community-level de-anonymization. Since the mapping between Q and I does not matter, the number of matched communities C Q (defined as follows) is more relevant than M Q to privacy measure.
Definition 6 (Matched Community). Given G and Q, a matched community is a subset
There is no exact relationship between C Q and M Q . C Q can be counted by checking the nodes of every match in M Q , which relies on the NP-complete subgraph matching enumeration problem.
-Indistinguishability. We can define -lndistinguishability to measure the privacy of the published graph G, which is similar to k-anonymity [38] . Suppose = M Q matches are found by querying G with Q, we say G satisfies weak -indistinguishability under the attack of Q. However, there might be overlapped nodes in the matches [6] . To overcome this weakness, we can construct a new query graph Q , which consists of disjoint copies of Q, and use Q to query G. If M Q ≥ 1, then we say strong -indistinguishability is achieved.
Strengths.
(1) Our theoretic analysis is conducted on random graphs, so the de-anonymization gain is estimated as an expectation. (2) We assume the attacker is computationally powerful enough to find all the matches of Q in G, regardless of what specific de-anonymization method he uses. Thus, the potential de-anonymization gain can also be seen as the de-anonymizability of G, which is useful for the publisher to estimate the privacy risk. (3) We introduce the general model of background knowledge as a probabilistic graph and the general process of de-anonymizationfuzzily matching Q and candidate subgraphs in G. Special cases like subset matching and exact matching are also introduced.
Limitations. (1) In reality, the attacker does not have unlimited computational power and the G is a specific graph (like a data point in the space of random graphs), so the real de-anonymization gain may deviate from our estimation. Still, our method provides the publisher/attacker a quick estimation of the privacy risk or de-anonymization gain before the actual attack. (2) We simulate de-anonymization with small-sized query graphs in the experiments. The results would be more comprehensive if we could also simulate on large-sized query graphs. However, this is extremely difficult to carry out due to the hardness of the subgraph counting problem.
De-anonymization with seed users. If the attacker always chooses easy targets or plants easily identifiable seed users in the network beforehand, then more knowledge is indeed better. This article assumes any user group could be the target, whether it is distinctive or ordinary. When the attacker's target is a group of users whose network is highly automorphic, it is intrinsically hard to de-anonymize them and the attacker is unable to "choose" a non-automorphic subgraph to improve the attack. In this sense, more knowledge might not always be better.
Future work.
It is worth further studying on top of this work how the graph publisher may anonymize G to efficiently reduce DAG (Q ) and how the attacker may choose target users and make use of the background knowledge to optimize her attack. In addition, we will run more experiments with larger query graphs when there is a breakthrough in solving or approximating the subgraph counting problem.
RELATED WORKS
Social Network Anonymization and De-Anonymization
The fight between de-anonymization and anonymization is becoming more and more fierce. Some researches aim at attacking/protecting an individual's privacy on the basis of k-anonymity [38] . For example, k-neighborhood anonymity [40, 43] was proposed to protect against 1-neighborhood attack and 1 * -neighborhood attack, and k 2 -degree anonymity [39] was proposed to defend against friendship attack, where the attacker is assume to know the degrees of two users who are friends. Some methods add great perturbations to the published graph to achieve k-candidate anonymity [14] , k-automorphism [45] , or k-isomorphism [6] , yet cause the loss of data utility/quality. Afterwards, Nettleton and Salas [26] designed a synthetic data generator that proved to cause lower utility loss.
Other related works focus on graph mapping attacks, also referred to as structure-based deanonymization, in which the attacker de-anonymizes users by mapping one network he possesses to the published network. Most of these attacks are seed-based [4, 7, 17, 25, 28, 29] . According to Peng et al. [29] , seed users are fake or compromised user accounts or outstanding users, such as users with very high degrees or distinctive neighborhood. Seed users are easy to re-identify compared with average users. After seed identification, mapping users and nodes is iteratively spread out from the neighbors of seed users based on structural characteristics. Chiasserini et al. [7] found that selecting seed users with more inhomogeneous node degrees makes de-anonymization easier. However, Ji et al. [17] showed that using overall structural information for de-anonymization is more powerful than using seed users only. There are also works that do not need seed users [18, 22, 27, 33, 34, 41] . As shown by Ji et al. [18] , most existing social network datasets are partially or completely de-anonymizable, and there is no effective countermeasures proposed yet. Wu et al. [41] found that overlapping communities can be exploited as side information for de-anonymization and proved it is NP-hard. Compared with these prior works, the goal of this article is not to design accurate and efficient de-anonymization methods, but to explore the intrinsic relationship between adversarial knowledge and the expected de-anonymization gain.
Besides social network, there are lines of researches on anonymization and de-anonymization of other data types, including tabular data [20, 23, 38] and speech data [31, 32] .
Subgraph Matching/Isomorphism
A widely accepted approximation of subgraph matching is to perform prune-and-search by indexing the graph data. Such approaches can be classified based on how indexing is performed: edge index [30] , frequent subgraph index [13] , and neighborhood index [44] . To our knowledge, the STwig deployed on Trinity Memory Cloud [37] is the most efficient; the run time is several seconds when a graph with tens of nodes and edges is queried over a graph of size 1 billion.
Extended from subgraph matching, the subgraph counting problem is more related to our article but even harder to solve. Most of existing algorithms can only estimate the count when the subgraph has a small size or a particular structure like tree, cycle, or triangle [5, 36] . Slota and Madduri [36] applied the color coding technique [2] to approximately count non-induced occurrences of tree subgraphs, yet the algorithm only supports querying subgraphs with at most 12 nodes.
The-state-of-the-art approximate algorithm was proposed by Chakaravarthy et al. [5] in 2016, which can efficiently find the matches for query graphs with treewidth no more than 2.
CONCLUSION
This work presents a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the attacker's background knowledge on de-anonymization gain for social network de-anonymization. First, we model deanonymization as the subgraph matching problem in a broad sense and define de-anonymization gain as the expected fraction of de-anonymized users. We also model background knowledge as a probabilistic graph and quantify it in both quantity and quality. Then, we discuss how the attacker tells if a subgraph is a "match" of her background knowledge in general, followed by several common special cases. A detailed theoretical analysis of the relationship between background knowledge and de-anonymization gain is presented for network data of two popular models (G(n, p) and power-law), which reveals that in some settings de-anonymization gain is not necessarily monotone increasing with the amount of background knowledge. Despite the hardness of subgraph counting, we conduct simulations on both synthetic and real networks, which further verifies our claim and leaves implications for the data protector and the attacker.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In Chung-Lu model [10] , given n nodes and a degree sequence (d 1 , d 2 , . . . ,d n ), an edge is added between any two nodes u and v with the probability p u,v = d u d v k ≤n d k . It is assumed that max{d 2 k } ≤ k ≤n d k [10] . Besides, the relation of n and α, β is
For the case of exact and partial knowledge with attribute ignored, the expected number of matches yielded from querying G with Q can be computed as follows. Let I be any induced subgraph of size n Q of G with the nodes mapped to nodes in Q, e.g., u , v , in I correspond to u, v, in Q:
(16) For any two edges (u 1 , v 1 ), (u 2 , v 2 ) in I , they might be adjacent, e.g. u 1 = u 2 . So d u 1 d v 1 and d u 2 d v 2 are either independent or positively correlated. Thus, we have cov (d u 1 d v 1 , d u 2 d v 2 ) ≥ 0, and then
whered is the average degree. Likewise, we have E( (u,v ) ∈E Q d u d v ) ≥d 2m Q . The sum of degrees in G is k ≤n d k = ∞ d =1 αd −β · d = α ∞ d =1 d 1−β = α β −2 , so the average degree isd = 1 n k ≤n d k = α (β −2)n . By Equation (16), we have
We will obtain the lower bound after substituting α with n, β by Equation (15).
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